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Confusion within the DMCA:
Resolving the Red Flag Knowledge Circuit Split

Part I. Introduction
As of July 25, 2015, users were uploading over 400 hours of video content to YouTube’s
platform every minute.1 This outrageous volume equates to more than 1,000 days of content
uploaded every hour.2 While YouTube is a powerhouse service provider offering a platform for
uploading and viewing video content, the above statistic only addresses one service provider
among many. YouTube’s prominence is a testament to how prevalent the internet has become as
a medium for posting videos to share information and entertain the masses, among other reasons.
With the constantly evolving nature of the internet comes the necessity to develop the law
surrounding the internet to protect users’ rights. Service providers, like YouTube, have become
a hotbed for instances of copyright infringement. Many instances are insignificant or receive no
attention and fly under the radar, but if someone were to sneak a video camera into the movie
theater and upload the latest blockbuster to a service provider to monetize the views for himself,
the movie’s producers will want to cut that off and seek a remedy for the damages incurred.
In order to protect service providers from facing liability for those 400 hours of video
uploaded each minute,3 Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).4
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Within this law, Congress created a safe harbor which protects service providers from liability
for copyright infringement when their users upload infringing material on the service provider’s
site and the service provider is unaware of the infringement.5 In order to prevent service
providers from accessing this safe harbor, copyright holders can offer to prove evidence that the
service provider had “actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing.”6 Alternatively, opposing parties to a service provider (i.e.
copyright owners) can prove the service provider was “aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.”7 This element of the statute, commonly referred to as the
red flag knowledge provision, has created confusion among the courts in deciding when exactly
the service provider meets the provision.
In Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, the Ninth Circuit created a standard for what
constitutes red flag knowledge.8 Although red flag knowledge must relate to particular
infringing activity, the court did not indicate that the activity must involve the particular works
that the plaintiff brought suit over.9 Further, the court held that material uploaded onto a service
provider’s network can be so “current and well-known” that its infringing nature would be
objectively obvious to a reasonable person.10 In Capital Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, the
Second Circuit strayed from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on two issues regarding red flag
knowledge.11 The Second Circuit held that the service provider lacked red flag knowledge
because the evidence did not relate to the specific videos at issue in this suit.12 Further, the court
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held that the fact that an employee of the service provider viewed a video with famous
copyrighted music was also insufficient to sustain the copyright holder’s burden of showing red
flag knowledge.13
Thus, the Second and Ninth Circuit are split on two issues related to red flag knowledge:
(1) whether the service provider must be aware of the particular works included in the suit by the
plaintiff to have red flag knowledge, and (2) whether content can be so famous or recognizable
that it would be objectively obvious to a reasonable person that the content is copyrighted and
has not been authorized to be used elsewhere. This comment will discuss the details of the
DMCA, then analyze the sequence of the cases that led to this circuit split, as well as provide an
argument for what the law should be.

Part II. Background
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA in an effort to update domestic copyright law
within the United States to keep up with the revolutionary digital age.14 According to the
legislative history of the act, Congress intended to clarify the potential liability faced by service
providers who transmit audio and video content over their networks.15 Service providers began
to face the risk of unintentionally transmitting infringing content, so Congress wanted to clarify
the liability that service providers face to prevent them from refraining to invest in the expansion
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of the speed and capacity of the internet.16 The provisions of the DMCA accomplish two things
to protect service providers.17 First, the act immunizes service providers that qualify for its
benefits from liability for copyright infringement caused by users posting on their websites if the
service providers are unaware of the infringements.18 Second, the act expressly relieves providers
of any obligation to monitor postings and detect infringements as a condition for qualifying for
the safe harbor.19
The DMCA established four safe harbors to protect service providers from liability.20
Those four safe harbors are codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512.21 The particular safe harbor that this
comment discusses is 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1), which reads as follows:

(1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as
provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service
provider-(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such
activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to
be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.22
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As the text of the provision indicates, § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) is known as the “actual knowledge”
requirement of the statute, because it requires that the service provider have actual knowledge of
the infringing material.23 The subsequent provision, § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), is known as the “red flag
knowledge” requirement because it dictates that, assuming a lack of actual knowledge, the
service provider was not aware of any apparent infringing activity based on the circumstances.24

B. Chronological Development of the Circuit Split on Red Flag Knowledge
The first noteworthy decision in the development of the split was UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC.25 Universal Music Group (UMG) was a music publishing
company that sued the service provider, Veoh Networks, who operated a publicly accessible
website for sharing videos.26 UMG filed suit for copyright infringement because Veoh permitted
its users to download videos containing songs that UMG owned the copyrights for.27 To upload
a video onto Veoh’s network, users first had to register their account, requiring them to agree to
Veoh’s terms and conditions telling the user not to upload infringing material.28 Further, users
received a message from Veoh ordering them not to upload infringing material prior to each
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video upload.29 While Veoh employees did not review the material or its tags before the video
became available, Veoh employed technology to prevent blatant copyright infringement.30
The Ninth Circuit held that “the language and structure of the statute, as well as the
legislative intent that motivated its enactment, clarif[ied] that § 512(c) encompasses the accessfacilitating processes that automatically occur when a user uploads a video to Veoh.”31 In other
words, the court extended the safe harbor to the functions automatically performed by Veoh’s
software when a user uploaded a video.32 The court refused to accuse Veoh of infringement
merely for having a category for music but lacking a license agreement from any major music
company, upholding the integrity of the safe harbor.33 The court noted that Congress made the
policy decision that the DMCA procedures would place the policing burden on the copyright
holders rather than the service providers.34 Copyrighters know what they own and are better
equipped to identify infringing copies than service providers like Veoh.35 Therefore, the court
held that a service provider’s general knowledge that its service could be used to share infringing
material is insufficient to constitute actual or red flag knowledge under the DMCA safe harbor. 36
Even after someone notifies the service provider that a video infringed, the service provider has
no duty to investigate further to search for and remove similar videos.37
The next landmark case in the progression of the split was the Second Circuit’s Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.38 Several plaintiffs filed a class action suit against YouTube over a
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period of years where they believed their copyrighted material was infringed on YouTube’s
video sharing platform.39 The plaintiffs claimed red flag knowledge was not limited to a
particular type of knowledge, and it requires less specificity than actual knowledge.40 They
argued that requiring awareness of specific infringements to meet the threshold of red flag
knowledge defeats the purpose of red flag knowledge because it would be no different from
actual knowledge.41
The Second Circuit affirmed that the red flag knowledge safe harbor required knowledge
or awareness of specific infringing activity.42 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, the court
declared that the statutory language in both the actual knowledge and red flag knowledge
provisions referred to “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.”43 Ruling along the
same lines as the Ninth Circuit in UMG Recordings, the Second Circuit demanded the service
provider had knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material because removal is only
possible if the provider knows which particular items to remove.44 The court established a
specific knowledge or awareness trigger because it would be unreasonable to require removal if
the service provider merely had a general awareness of the infringing content.45
The Second Circuit then addressed the plaintiffs’ concern regarding the
indistinguishability between actual knowledge and red flag knowledge provisions.46 The
difference is not between whether the service provider has specific or generalized knowledge,
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but rather on a subjective and objective standard.47 A provider has actual knowledge, the court
posited, when it actually or subjectively knew of the specific infringement.48 A provider has red
flag knowledge, on the other hand, when it “was subjectively aware of facts that would have
made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”49 Thus, both
provisions apply to only specific instances of infringement, but actual knowledge rests on a
subjective standard while red flag knowledge on an objective standard.50 No court has held that
the red flag provision requires less specificity than the actual knowledge provision, so the
Second Circuit maintained that position as well.51
To clarify further, there were two instances of infringement in Viacom that the Second
Circuit decided on.52 Multiple surveys estimated that between sixty and eighty percent of
content hosted by YouTube contained copyrighted material, but copyright owners only
authorized around ten percent of that material.53 The court ruled that this constituted general
knowledge of infringement among YouTube, which was insufficient to identify specific
instances.54 Email correspondence, however, shared between YouTube owners in which they
acknowledged specific infringing videos and failed to remove those videos was at least enough
to send to a factfinder to determine if the owners had actual or red flag knowledge.55
The next case in the development of the common law on red flag knowledge was
Columbia Pictures Indus. V. Fung.56 Gary Fung ran a video streaming company that operated
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multiple websites.57 The plaintiff’s infringement accusation rested on a peer-to-peer file sharing
protocol that Fung employed called BitTorrent.58 Fung used BitTorrent to acquire audio and
video files to host on his website, many of which infringed on copyrights.59 Fung acquired the
files by soliciting them from users who uploaded them or by using automated processes to
collect files from other torrent sites.60 Three of Fung’s websites were torrent sites that collected
and organized torrent files to allow users to browse in and search the websites’ collections.61
The Ninth Circuit held Fung ineligible for the § 512(c) safe harbor provisions.62
Reiterating the statute, the court stated that “The § 512(c) safe harbor is available only if the
service provider does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing, . . . or is not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent.”63 The court felt no need to even consider the
adequacy or inadequacy of the notifications Fung received from the plaintiff because Fung had
red flag knowledge of a broad range of infringing activity.64 Fung actively encouraged
infringement by urging users to upload and download copyrighted works, assisting those seeking
to watch copyrighted films, and helping his users burn copyrighted materials onto DVDs.65
Applying the standard made by the Second Circuit in Viacom, the Ninth Circuit found the
material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively
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obvious to a reasonable person that the material solicited was both copyrighted and not licensed
to random members of the public.66
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fung created the first glimpse of a split between the
Second and Ninth Circuits. Both circuits applied the standard that red flag knowledge requires
specific knowledge or awareness of particular infringing activity.67 But the Second Circuit in
Viacom only considered the knowledge of the clips-in-suit, because “[b]y definition, only the
current clips-in-suit [were] at issue in [that] litigation.”68 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
made no indication that the service provider must have red flag knowledge pertaining to the
specific works that the plaintiff sued over.69 While it may be clear that Fung had knowledge of
all the infringement he induced and encouraged, the Ninth Circuit’s decision left the gate open to
service providers being liable for content not involved in the lawsuit.70
After Fung, the Second Circuit diverged even farther from the Ninth Circuit in its Capitol
Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC decision.71 Vimeo was an internet service provider that operated a
website where members can post videos for the general public.72 The plaintiffs filed suit because
they owned copyrights in sound recordings and musical performances, which they alleged
Vimeo was liable infringing those copyrights of the content posted on Vimeo’s site.73 Like
YouTube, Vimeo users had to agree to Vimeo’s terms and conditions prior to uploading videos,
which involved agreeing not to post infringing material.74 Vimeo properly adhered to removing

66

Id. at 1042.
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32; Fung, 710 F.3d at 1043.
68
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 34.
69
Fung, 710 F.3d at 1043.
70
Id.
71
826 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 2016).
72
Id. at 81.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 84.
67

11

all videos for which copyright owners sent a takedown notice, but the plaintiffs in this case did
not send a takedown notice for any of the videos in this suit.75 The distinguishing fact about this
case that leads to the circuit split was that Vimeo employed a team that located and removed
videos that may contain content that violates its Terms of Service.76 The court faced the question
of “whether evidence of some viewing by Vimeo employees of videos that played all or virtually
all of ‘recognizable’ copyrighted songs was sufficient to satisfy the standard of red flag
knowledge.”77
The Second Circuit held that exposure by the employee of a service provider to a video
that plays all or most of a “recognizable” copyrighted song was not sufficient to establish red
flag knowledge.78 The court applied the standard it created in Viacom, which states that “in
order to be disqualified from the benefits of the safe harbor by reason of red flag knowledge
under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), the service provider must have actually known facts that would make
the specific infringement claimed objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”79 The court
elaborated that a “reasonable person” refers to an ordinary person that does not have any
specialized knowledge or expertise concerning music or the laws of copyright.80 The fact that an
employee happened to see a video containing a copyrighted song that is recognizable was
insufficient to make infringement obvious to an ordinary reasonable person.81 The court relied
on the evidence in the record, which lacked any specific information regarding how much of the
video the employee viewed or for what reason he viewed it.82 Further, the DMCA explicitly
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relieves service providers from the obligation to seek indications of infringement in § 512(m), so
the court could not assume this was the reason for the employee’s viewing.83
A substantial issue in Capital Records that affected the court’s decision was who
maintained the burdens of proof in deciding whether or not Vimeo was entitled to the safe
harbor.84 The safe harbor is an affirmative defense, so the burden rested on the defendant to
prove it qualified for the safe harbor.85 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant “should be disqualified based on the copyright owner’s accusations of misconduct.”86
For example, when the copyright holder sends a takedown notification to a service provider and
the service provider fails to adhere to the statute, the burden of proof rests on the copyright
holder.87 Thus, the copyright owner has the burden of showing the service provider acquired red
flag knowledge and failed to remove the infringing matter.88
In Capital Records, the fact that a user posted a video on the service provider’s site and
an employee of the service provider viewed the video was insufficient for Vimeo to prove
Capital Records had red flag knowledge.89 The court first reasoned that the viewing might have
been brief.90 It was possible that the employee only viewed enough of the video to post a
comment, hit the like button, or add it to a channel, all of which could have been too short to
identify an infringing audio track.91 There were several purposes for which the employee could
have been viewing the video, such as applying a technical element, classifying the subject
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matter, checking for obscenities, or anything else that does not involve searching for copyright
infringement.92 Further, the fact that music is recognizable or famous is insufficient to
demonstrate that the music was in fact recognized by a hypothetical ordinary individual who has
no specialized knowledge in the field of music.93 The court explained that “[s]ome ordinary
people know little or nothing of music. Lovers of one style or category of music may have no
familiarity with other categories. For example, 60-year-olds, 40-year-olds, and 20-year-olds,
even those who are music lovers, may know and love entirely different bodies of music, so that
music intimately familiar to some may be entirely unfamiliar to others.”94 Employees of service
providers also could not be assumed to have expertise in copyright law, such as distinguishing
between illegal infringement and permissible parodies, nor could they be expected to know the
likelihood that the user lacked authorization before uploading.95
Ensuring to address the recurring argument made by the plaintiffs in Viacom which
questioned whether there is a difference between the actual knowledge and red flag knowledge
provisions96, the Second Circuit explained that this standard of red flag knowledge does not
render the statute superfluous because there is still a distinguishing difference between red flag
knowledge and actual knowledge.97 The court articulated that if an employee of the service
provider has actual knowledge that would make infringement obvious, then that constitutes red
flag knowledge and the service provider is not eligible for the safe harbor.98 In the
aforementioned scenario, the service provider cannot escape liability through the safe harbor by
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claiming the employee who had the actual knowledge never thought of the obvious significance
of what the employee knew in relation to infringement, because it was red flag knowledge.99
Thus, if a copyright holder can prove the service provider’s employee was aware of sufficient
facts that make infringement obvious to a reasonable person, then the service provider is not
protected by the safe harbor.100
In addition to pardoning Vimeo from red flag knowledge, the Second Circuit reaffirmed
the works-in-suit principle it created in Viacom.101 In Capital Records, the plaintiff failed to
offer evidence that related directly to the videos at issue in the suit, so the existing evidence was
insufficient to justify a finding of red flag knowledge.102 This is the same principle that the
Ninth Circuit failed to specifically align with in Fung.103
Summing up the current inconsistencies between the Second and Ninth Circuit, there are
two issues that require settling. The first issue is whether a service provider must have
knowledge specifically about content in the plaintiff’s complaint to be eligible for the safe
harbor. The Second Circuit created this requirement in Viacom and affirmed it in Capital
Records, demanding that the service provider in both cases have knowledge about the videos
mentioned in the suit.104 The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to apply the same standard in Fung,
because the service provider had red flag knowledge over infringing works, but not necessarily
the same works that the plaintiff sued over.105 The second issue between the two appellate courts
is whether a service provider can gain red flag knowledge by looking at an infringing work.
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While both circuits applied the standard that a service provider has red flag knowledge if it was
subjectively aware of facts that would have made the infringement objectively obvious to a
reasonable person,106 the Ninth Circuit held the material in question was sufficiently well-known
to be objectively obvious to a reasonable person.107 The Second Circuit, on the other hand,
found the objectively obvious standard cannot be applied that way to instill red flag knowledge
because people have different tastes and exposure to music, so there cannot be a reasonable
person standard.108

C. Current Scholarship on Red Flag Knowledge
Edward Lee conducted an analysis on the service provider’s “awareness of infringement”
aspect of the safe harbor.109 Based on legislative history, Lee claims the “awareness” should be
judged both subjectively and objectively.110 By subjective, he believes they intended to assess
the service provider’s actual state of mind, and by objective, ask “whether infringing activity
would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar
circumstances.”111 Based on the text, Congress intended to establish a high standard of
knowledge to serve the purpose of the safe harbor, because a low standard would have opened
the floodgates to constant litigation against service providers.112 Lee conducted a dictionary
definition analysis of “apparent,” which means (1) readily seen; exposed to sight; open to view;
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visible, or (2) capable of being easily perceived or understood; plain or clear; obvious.113 He
concluded from the analysis that one is aware of apparent infringing activity when it is plain,
clear, or obvious that infringement is occurring based on the facts.114 Congress also intended for
a high standard of awareness because the question of infringement is complex and they did not
want to burden service providers with the task of determining what online content infringes on
another’s rights.115 Thus, for infringing activity to be “apparent” under the red flag test, it must
be clearly infringing, like a well-known pirating site.116
To apply his ideas, Lee posed a hypothetical scenario of a YouTube employee that
stumbles upon a video with a thumbnail of Jerry Seinfeld entitled “Seinfeld” and asks whether
this constitutes red flag awareness.117 Based on his reading of the DMCA, Lee believes this does
not constitute red flag awareness because “the employee’s mere knowledge of a Jerry Seinfeld
thumbnail image or screenshot on the website would not constitute being ‘aware of facts from
which infringing activity is apparent.’ It is not plain, clear, or obvious that a mere screenshot of
Jerry Seinfeld is copyright infringement.”118 While it is possible that the video contained a
bootlegged episode, it could just be a single photograph or a random teaser thrown in to attract
more views.119 The content could also be a fair use of copyrighted material if the Seinfeld
copyright holder authorized its use or if the video was just a parody.120 Moreover, the DMCA
does not require the service provider to conduct any further research in determining copyright
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infringement, so the YouTube employee in this situation is relieved of that obligation. 121 Lee
rapped up his take on the red flag knowledge provision by sensibly pointing out that the safe
harbors need to be clarified because “an unclear safe harbor can act as a ‘trap’ for the wary by
dangling the false prospect of immunity from liability in front of businesses who then invest
millions of dollars in reliance on this false promise.”122
Robert J. Williams provided a thoughtful disposition on the DMCA and the court’s
interpretation of it in the New England Law Review.123 Despite Congress’s intentions to
improve and clarify the relationships between copyright holders and service providers, the
DMCA initially came out with much ambiguity.124 He praised the Second Circuit for its decision
in Viacom because it placed the state of the law on the proper path.125 Williams claimed that
“[t]he Second Circuit rightfully held item-specific knowledge of infringement is required”
because it created a fairer environment for copyright owners.126 Courts were reluctant to find
apparent knowledge under the red flag test prior to Viacom, but the Second Circuit opened the
gates for copyright owners to assert liability.127 The court “differentiate[d] specific knowledge
as requiring both a subjective and objective knowledge analysis under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), as
opposed to specific knowledge under the § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and general knowledge under §
512(c)(1)(A)(ii).”128 Relying less on the general knowledge requirement and maintaining the
high standard of specific proof provides copyright owners a greater opportunity to recover for
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infringement.129 Overall, copyright holders are facing an uphill battle to prove infringement, but
the Second Circuit realigned the DMCA more closely to Congress’s intentions by establishing a
more accessible standard for the red flag test.130
Published in the New York University Law Review, Xiao Ma conducted a thorough
analysis of the American red flag knowledge provision to compare to that of China’s.131 With
the internet encouraging copyright law to be a global issue, the requisite level of knowledge
possessed by the service provider in determining its liability of online copyright infringement
committed by its users has also been a major controversy in China.132 One Chinese regulation
used the terms “knows” or “reasonable ground to know” for limiting the liability of services that
provide digital storage space.133 Another regulation used the phrases “explicitly knows” and
“should have known” for a service that provides searching or linking services, which aligns
closely with the verbiage of the American red flag knowledge provision.134
Chinese courts have been running into the same issues and have issued split decisions on
similar matters.135 In one case, IFPI v. Baidu, the plaintiffs sued a service provider for providing
links to a website that offered free downloading of infringing songs.136 The court held that the
plaintiff failed to notify the service provider of the infringing files and the service provider had
no fault for searching and linking to the other websites because it “should not have known” of
the infringing material.137 In a similar case, IFPI v. Yahoo, the service provider was held liable
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for aiding infringement by providing links to the third party websites for free music
downloading.138 Here, the music labels sent notices to the defendant including the name of the
song, album and singer of each infringing file, which the court held were enough to locate the
copyrighted music because the service provider, Yahoo, “should have known” of the
infringement.139 In a third case, Fanya v. Baidu, the copyright holder sent notices to the service
provider demanding them to disconnect access to the infringing material, but the rights holder
only provided the name of the song.140 Such minimal information made it very difficult for the
service provider to locate the copyrighted material.141 Thus, Chinese courts have taken a similar
stance to distinguish guilty service providers – those that have specific knowledge of the exact
instances of infringement – from innocent service providers – those that have a mere general
knowledge of infringement.
The Chinese courts formulated a solution to what constitutes “known” or “should have
known” that can be considered while American courts wade through a similar issue.142 The
courts first agreed upon the point that the copyright holder must send a notice sufficient to locate
the infringing material.143 If the copyright holder can prove the sufficiency of the notice, the
service provider has red flag knowledge of the infringement.144 The second point related to
situations in which the service provider provides a list to its users, viewers, listeners, etc.145 The
court pointed out that there are two methods upon which users can look for or stumble upon
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content.146 One method is the search box, which involves no bias among the content and only
displays material based on the key words a user enters into the search box.147 To attract users,
however, it is very common for a service provider to promote material.148 Thus, the second
method by which users find content is from the service provider promoting lists such as “top 100
songs” or “featured videos of the day.”149 Ma argues that the culpability between the two
methods, searching versus promoting, is different.150 The service provider must exercise a
greater duty of care when providing lists to its users in cases where the infringing material is
apparent from a glance at the list, in which case the service provider is required to disconnect it
rather than turning a blind eye to infringement.151 Meanwhile, a service provider will not face
the same culpability for material discovered by searching with key words.152
Like American courts and professionals, Chinese legal professionals struggle to agree
upon interpreting their regulations, debating whether the term “know” includes “should have
known” or “have reason to know.”153 Some argue “know” includes “should have known”
because it prevents guilty service providers from escaping liability as easily if the standard were
only based on actual knowledge.154 Meanwhile, others disagree because interpreting it that way
would incur too high a duty of care on the service providers.155 Some subscribe to a third
opinion that the knowledge requirement includes “have reason to know” because it invokes an
awareness of facts or circumstances.156 The Chinese courts concluded that the term “know” in
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the regulation embraces the meaning of “explicitly know” and “should have known” to
determine the service provider’s knowledge of copyright infringement committed by a third
party.157
One expert, Ma noted, proposed the idea of a multifactor test for courts to consider when
evaluating the relationship between the service provider and the third party user.158 In applying
the test, no one factor would be dispositive, but multiple factors could convince the court to
impose liability on the service provider.159 A sample list of the factors included (1) the extent of
the service provider’s involvement, (2) knowledge of infringing activities, (3) intention of the
service provider, (4) extent of infringement and lawful activities, (5) financial or other benefit of
the service provider, (6) ability to prevent or deter infringement, and (7) due care of the service
provider, and (8) a cost-benefit analysis.160

Part III. The Second Circuit Interpreted the Red Flag Knowledge Provisions Correctly and
Should Be Followed on Both Issues
The Second and Ninth Circuits delivered decisions that led to a split application of the
law on two issues related to red flag knowledge. The first issue, evolving from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Viacom and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fung, questions whether a
service provider must have red flag knowledge of the specific work a plaintiff sued over to be
stripped of protection from the DMCA safe harbor. The second issue, stemming from the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Fung and the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Capital Records,
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questions whether content can be sufficiently “famous” that its infringing nature would be
objectively obvious to a reasonable person. This analysis discusses in detail the appropriate
decisions on each issue.

A. The Second Circuit is correct in holding that red flag knowledge must be determined on a
work-by-work basis for only the works-in-suit
The Second Circuit in Viacom held that a service provider can only have red flag
knowledge of content which the plaintiff included in the complaint.161 The Second Circuit
reaffirmed that principle in Capital Records.162 The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to specify in
Fung that the service provider could only have red flag knowledge over the works included in
the suit.163 The court found sufficient evidence in the record to strip Fung of protection from the
safe harbor because he had red flag knowledge of his infringement and inducement of
infringement, but the court associated that red flag knowledge with works not necessarily
included in the complaint.164 The Second Circuit correctly held courts should only be able to
find red flag knowledge of the works included in the suit.
The application of the safe harbor provision and the determination of whether red flag
knowledge applies is a fact-sensitive issue. There is no limit to the possible scenarios and
circumstances that can exist in a case of copyright infringement. Taking into consideration the
advancement of the internet and the constant development of technology, new situations will
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continue to arise. Thus, red flag knowledge should be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis,
specifically evaluating the work for which the rights holder complains of infringement.
Evidence of general awareness of infringement is not sufficient to show the service
provider had a particular awareness of infringement of the works-in-suit. While some cases can
be clear instance of infringement by the service provider, the court must draw a line to protect
innocent service providers. Platforms like YouTube and Vimeo provide incredible opportunities
to connect and share content with the world, so they warrant protection from bad faith infringers
who might use their platforms unlawfully. Many service providers are far too large to monitor
infringers that fly under the radar, so the burden of policing should fall heavily onto the rights
holders.
Holding copyright holders responsible for monitoring the infringement of their own
copyrights makes good sense. The holders of the copyrights are the people reaping the benefit of
those rights, and they should be more capable of finding culprits of infringement, along with
having greater incentive. The courts can examine cases using the factors listed by Ma to ensure
there is no ill will on the service provider’s end, such as financial benefit and due care of the
service provider.165 While service providers should by no means be encouraging copyright
infringement, they are merely a medium for the creation and publishing of creative content. The
best way to protect this valuable system of producing, sharing, and viewing content is to
establish a high standard of red flag knowledge and place a heavier burden on the rights holders
than the service providers. This application of the law is consistent with Congress’s intention to
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hold awareness to a high standard to avoid burdening service providers with the task of finding
and determining infringement.166

B. The Second Circuit is correct in holding that an employee of the service provider viewing a
video with “famous” music is insufficient to constitute red flag knowledge
The Second Circuit in Capital Records held a service provider’s exposure to all or most
of a “recognizable” song was insufficient to constitute red flag knowledge.167 The Ninth Circuit
in Fung, however, held that the material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that
it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person that the content lacked
authorization and infringed on another’s rights.168 These two holdings beg the question of
whether creative content, such as a song, can ever be sufficiently famous, well-known, or
recognizable that a reasonable person would be aware that someone owns the copyright to that
material and someone else infringes on those rights. Courts should follow the precedent set by
the Second Circuit in Capital Records which stated the law should not expect a reasonable
person to be capable of recognizing copyright infringement of a specific material upon exposure
to it.169
In the case of Capital Records, whether the employee was aware that the music was
famous and copyrighted should be a question of fact decided by the factfinder. The dispute
should not be held to the standard of what might be objectively obvious to a reasonable person.
The descriptive terms “famous” and “recognizable” are subjective adjectives that cannot be
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adequately quantified or measured to settle a legal issue. Every person lives a different life, and
many are not fluent or well-versed in the field of music. People can live their lives without
exposure to what some or even most might consider “popular” music. Certain forms of media,
such as radio or online music databases like Spotify, often dictate and sway what music is
popular at any given time. A simple lack of access to those types of mediums is all it takes to
remain unfamiliar with content that others consider “well-known.”
The Second Circuit identifies several valid reasons in Capital Records in support of
denying service provider’s liability for stumbling upon alleged infringement of objectively wellknown content.170 The court accurately pointed out that average ordinary people may not know
the first thing about music.171 For those that are interested in music, many people pigeon-hole
themselves into certain categories or genres and lack any exposure beyond those self-inflicted
parameters.172 Particularly, different age groups grow up in different decades and eras, thus
developing different musical tastes.173 The analysis the court applied for music can equally
translate to other forms of copyrightable media, such as movies, television shows, and books. In
the context of a service provider’s liability, the Second Circuit’s principles should be applied to
all of these categories when determining whether a disputed content was objectively famous or
recognizable.
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C. The Practical Ramifications of Implementing the Second Circuit’s Solution
The Second Circuit plausibly addressed the counterargument to the court’s decision in
Capital Records.174 The plaintiffs in Viacom first presented the argument that raising the red flag
knowledge standard defeats the purpose of the provision because it would consequently be no
different than the actual knowledge provision.175 The court explained that a service provider has
red flag knowledge when it possesses actual knowledge that would make the infringement
obvious.176 Therefore, a copyright holder need not necessarily prove the service provider had
actual knowledge of infringement to deny safe harbor eligibility, but the rights holder can merely
prove the service provider was aware of facts that make infringement obvious to a reasonable
person.177
There is concern that the Second Circuit’s decision raised the red flag knowledge
standard too high, but the standard should be high. Service providers deserve extensive
protection from liability in these situations, and the court proved that the standard is not so
extreme that it violates the text of the law as written by Congress. Copyright holders still
maintain the opportunity to prove that a service provider was sufficiently aware of the infringing
content and failed to expeditiously remove it from the provider’s platform.
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IV. Conclusion
The Second and Ninth Circuits are currently split on two important issues relating to red
flag knowledge. First, the Ninth Circuit believes that “knowledge of a broad range of infringing
activity” is sufficient to constitute red flag knowledge,178 while the Second Circuit requires
service providers to be aware of the specific works-in-suit to be shackled with red flag
knowledge.179 Second, the Ninth Circuit believes material posted on a service provider’s site can
be so famous such that a reasonable person presented with the content would be capable of
recognizing its infringement,180 while the Second Circuit found that music cannot be so
recognizable.181 The Second Circuit took the correct stance on both fronts in deciding that
service providers can only have red flag knowledge over the content for which the plaintiff
sues,182 and material cannot be sufficiently famous that a case of its infringement would be
objectively obvious.183 If the Supreme Court of the United States were to settle this dispute, they
would have their work cut out for them because the Second Circuit provided the best roadmap
for preserving the safety and business of the internet service providers.
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